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Abstract
Detecting and responding to security and privacy threats
on RadioFrequency IDentiﬁcation(RFID) technologiesare
becomingone of the major concernsof informationsecurity
researchers. However, and before going further in these ac-
tivities, anevaluationofthreats interms ofimportancemust
be done. We present in this paper an evaluation of threats
onElectronicProductCode(EPC)basedRFIDsystems. We
analyzethe set of threats accordingto the methodologypro-
posed by the European Telecommunications Standards In-
stitute (ETSI), and we rank these threats in order of rele-
vance. This ranking may be used for researchers and pro-
fessionals to prioritize threats for future security research
on EPC applications (e.g., research on appropriate coun-
termeasure mechanisms).
Keywords: Radio frequency identiﬁcation (RFID); Elec-
tronic Product Code (EPC); Information systems security;
Threats analysis; Interoperability; Policy management.
1 Introduction
Security and privacy threats on Radio Frequency IDentiﬁ-
cation (RFID) technologies are gaining importance in in-
formation security research, and lots of analysis, studies,
and solutions have recently appeared in the related litera-
ture(e.g.,workspresentedin[10,13,15,16,19]). Although
RFID technologyhas been usedto identifyobjectsand indi-
vidualsformorethan60years(e.g.,IdentiﬁcationFriend or
Foe Systems on World War II [4]) it is now that security and
privacy issues concerning modern RFID applications (e.g.,
supply chain inventory, health care, animal identiﬁcation,
electronic passports, and so on) are actively being debated
and getting more and more attention from both consumers
and industrial producers.
Regarding these increasing concerns, we are currently
analyzing which of those threats reported on recent litera-
ture are really relevant for research purposes. For our work,
we focus on threats that may affect the exchange of infor-
mation and services between the components of an RFID
system and, more speciﬁcally, those RFID setups compliant
with the data-on-networkapproach proposed by EPCglobal
Inc. [5] (cf. Section 3). The methodologyused for our anal-
ysis is based on the evaluation of threats proposed by the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI),
and which proposes the identiﬁcation of threats depending
ontheirlikelihoodofoccurrence,theirpossibleimpactupon
targeted systems, and the risk that they may represent [9]
for such systems. In this paper,we present the results of our
evaluation. Theseresults are intendedforleadingfurtherre-
search and developments on relevant security mechanisms
for EPC based RFID scenarios.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we outline the methodology we used to conduct
our analysis of threats. In Section 3 we overview the main
properties of an RFID system based on the EPCglobal net-
work, and present our analysis of threats. We ﬁnally close
thepaperin Section4bysummarizingthe mainconclusions
of our work and pointing out to future perspectives.
2 Analysis methodology
We deﬁne for our work a threat as the objective of an at-
tacker in order to violate the security or privacy of a target
system. We deﬁne in turn an attacker as the speciﬁc agent
or entity which is going to exploit a given vulnerability at
the targeted system in order to manage the threat. The ex-
ploitation of such vulnerability is deﬁned in our work as
the attack that establishes the threat upon the target system.
Mitigation mechanisms, often referred in the literature as
countermeasures, must be established by the security ofﬁ-cer of the targeted system in order to reduce or, if possible,
prevent, the illegal activity associated with each possible
threat. Giventheimpossibilityofapplyingcountermeasures
for every possible threat against a system, it is crucial for
a security ofﬁcer to identify those threats that might have
a high impact upon the system they are in charge of and,
then, guarantee the enforcement of such countermeasures.
This is indeed the objective of the methodology proposed
for our analysis of threats. More speciﬁcally, the methodol-
ogy used in this paper is based on an evaluation framework
proposed by the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) in [9]; but slightly modiﬁed in order to take
into account the suggestions introduced in [3] for identify-
ing relevant threats and security ﬂaws on current wireless
network applications. We present in the following the key
points of this methodology.
The methodology proposed by ETSI identiﬁes the
following categories of threats: critical, major, and minor.
Such categories depend in turn on the estimated values for
the likelihood of occurrence of the threat and its impact
upon a given user or system. More speciﬁcally, a threat
is ranked in [9] as minor if it is unlikely and has low or
medium impact, or if it is possible but low impact; it is
ranked as major if it is possible and has medium impact;
and it is critical if one of the following conditions hold: it
is likely and has high impact; it is likely and has medium
impact; or it is possible and has high impact. However, the
authors in [3] pointed out that throughtheir experiencewith
the ETSI methodology, many threats were over-classiﬁed
as critical when they should better be ranked as major. We
indeed maintain this observation, and adopt for our work
the likelihood and risk functions suggested in [3] in order
to focus on truly critical threats.
Figure 1. Likelihood of a threat.
We show in Figure 1 the likelihood function of a threat.
Let us notice that in such a ﬁgure the evaluation of the like-
lihood is based on the following parameters: the motiva-
tion for an attacker to carry out the attack path associated
to the risk; and the technical difﬁculties that must be re-
solved by the attacker in order to apply such an attack. The
three values associated with the likelihood function are the
following ones: (1) likely, if the targeted user or system is
almost assured of being victimized, given a high attacker
motivation (e.g., ﬁnancial gains as a result of selling pri-
vate information or disrupting network services) and lack
of technical difﬁculties (e.g., a precedent for the attack al-
ready exists); (2) possible, if the motivation for the attacker
is moderate (e.g., limited ﬁnancial gains) and the technical
difﬁculties are potentially solvable (e.g, the required theo-
retical and practical knowledge for implementing the attack
is available);and(3)unlikely,incasethatthereis little moti-
vation for perpetrating the speciﬁc attack (e.g., few or none
ﬁnancial gains for implementing the attack) or if signiﬁcant
technical difﬁculties and obstacles must be overcome (e.g,
theoretical or practical elements for perpetrating the attack
are still missing).
Figure 2. Risk evaluation function.
On the other hand, we show in Figure 2 the risk of a
threat as a function of its likelihood and impact. The lat-
ter parameter, i.e., impact, evaluates which are the conse-
quences for the victim if the threat is successfully carried
out upon it. For our work we assume that such a victim
is an EPC based RFID system serving several users, rather
than a single user; and we identify the following three cate-
gories: (1) low if the attack results in limited outages (e.g.,
short duration) and can quickly be repaired without suf-
fering from ﬁnancial losses; (2) medium if the outages are
limited in time but might result in few ﬁnancial losses; (3)
high if the attack associated with the threat results in out-
ages overa long period of time with a largenumberof users
affected, and potentially accompanied by law violations or
substantial ﬁnancial losses. Taking into consideration these
deﬁnitions, we establish the rules for managing the three
risk categories aforementioned, i.e., critical, major, and mi-
nor risk. Except for the latter one, which typically requires
no countermeasures, both major and critical threats need
to be handled with appropriate countermeasures, being, of
course, critical threats which should be addressed with the
highest priority.
23 EPC/RFID threat analysis
Acclaimed as the successors of today’s omnipresent bar-
codes [13], RFID devices — often referred in the litera-
ture as RFID tags — are electronic devices that use radio
waves to automatically identify objects or people. These
devices may be mainly classiﬁed as either active (whose
transmission power comes from on-board batteries to an-
swer RFID readers and/or to broadcast signals) or passive1
(whose transmission power is directly derived from the sig-
nal of the RFID readers). Passive tags are the cheapest
RFID devices we may ﬁnd on the market for RFID Sup-
ply Chain item-level tagging (about 5 U.S. cents apiece in
volumes of 100 million, and 7.9 U.S. cents in volumes of
1 million or more2 [18]) and, thus, the main kind of RFID
tags spread in today’s RFID Supply Chain applications.
More speciﬁcally, the main kind of passive RFID tags
spread on those applications are known as Electronic Prod-
uct Code (EPC) tags. EPC tags were designed by the MIT’s
Auto-ID Center [2] and further developed by EPCglobal
Inc. They represent the basis of a distributed architecture
often referred in the literature as the EPCglobal network
[5], and which is based on a data-on-network approach for
the automatic identiﬁcation of objects in motion on supply
chain and industrial production applications (among oth-
ers). By using this paradigm, a globally unique number is
assignedto everyEPC tag. This uniquenumberis then used
to identify objects in motion and get further information
about them through Internet based technologies. Hence,
the information about an object is not necessarily stored on
the RFID tag, but instead supplied by distributed servers
on the Internet [5]. To do so, EPCglobal proposes, more-
over, a public lookup system for compliant EPC applica-
tions, calledthe Object NameService(ONS) [8], andwhich
behaves in a similar manner as the Domain Name System
(DNS) does.
Before going further in this section, let us introduce the
components and the exchange of information and services
of this framework through the scenario shown in Figure 3,
where we can see the EPC system of a company A which is
composed of the following elements: (1) a set TA of RFID
tags; (2) a set RA of RFID readers; and (3) an EPC based
application which is composed, in turn, of a set of EPC
middleware instances (MA), a set of address managers (AA),
and a set of EPC Information Services (ISA). As we intro-
duced above, every tag t ∈ TA has been assigned a globally
unique number which is used to identify an object in mo-
tion within the supply chain of company A. Each reader
1A third category, often referred in the literature as semi-passive tags,
uses a battery to power on-board microchips, but not to either broadcast
signals or answer RFID readers.
2Including additional RFID features, especially for security purposes,
may increase the total end-cost of these devices up to 15 U.S cents apiece
or more.
Figure 3. EPCglobal network based scenario.
r ∈ RA is strategically placed within the supply chain, and
reads each tagged object as it passes by its associated area.
Then, it sends the associated identiﬁer of each tag it reads,
together with other additional information, such as times-
tamps and its location, to a middleware instance m ∈ MA.
This middleware instance controls and integrates the infor-
mation sent by the different readers and other local infras-
tructurecomponents,andthen forwardsit to the appropriate
informationservice is∈ISA for sharingit amongauthorized
tradingpartnersthroughInternet. To do so, an address man-
ager instance a ∈ AA has previously published the appropri-
ate addresses to the discovery services associated with the
application. Both ONS and DNS are the components of the
discovery services that are going to allow an external appli-
cation e ∈ E to ﬁnd data related to the speciﬁc EPC tags in
TA, and to request access to the information services in ISA.
Regarding the different stages of the process presented
above, let us split the complete group of threats that we are
going to analyze for our work into the following groups:
(1) ID system threats targeting the information transaction
between RFID tags and readers via wireless connections;
(2) EPC middleware threats targeting the managing of in-
formation within middleware instances; (3) Discovery ser-
vice threats targeting the exchange of information during
the address discovery process; and (4) Information service
3Threat Objectives
Conﬁdentiality Integrity Accountability Availability
Spooﬁng of identities X X X X
Tampering with data X X X
Repudiation X
Information disclosure X
Denial of service X
Elevation of privilege X X X X
Table 1. Threats to the security attributes of a system.
threats targeting the procedure for accessing the informa-
tion in EPC information services (EPCIS) by external ap-
plications. We present in the sequel an evaluation for each
one of these groups, and rank the resulting list of threats by
order of relevance.
3.1 ID system threats
Thecommunicationchannelbetweenthecomponentsofthe
ID system, i.e., RFID tags and readers, is a, potentially in-
secure, wireless channel. It is therefore fair to assume that
most of the security and privacy threats on EPC based se-
tups are going to target this ﬁrst level. As a result, most of
recent publications regarding security and privacy concerns
on RFID systems report threats on it.
In [19], for example, the authors identify potential
threats to commercial supply chains regarding attacks to
and by the ID system of supply chain applications. Their
categorization is built on the well-known STRIDE model
[12], which is used for the designing of secure software
systems, and whose name corresponds to the ﬁrst charac-
ter of the following six threat categories [19]: (S)pooﬁng of
identities, e.g., a reader r′ / ∈ RA or a tag t′ / ∈ TA are placed,
respectively, as an authorized reader r ∈ RA or tag t ∈ TA
in the ID system; (T)ampering with data, e.g., loss or cor-
ruption of the information stored within tag t, or its trans-
mission to reader r; (R)epudiation, e.g., lack of proof in the
ID system to demonstrate that the information stored in t
has been transmitted to reader r; (I)nformation disclosure,
e.g., illegal disclosure of the data stored within tag t dur-
ing its transmission to reader r; (D)enial of service, e.g., tag
t and/or reader r fail to perform the exchange of informa-
tion; (E)levation of privilege, e.g., tag t and/or reader r gain
higher privileges in the ID system. We refer the reader to
[19] for further examples.
We group in Table 1 the security attributes targeted by
the set of threats summarized with STRIDE. We can see in
this table that some threats are only targeting a single secu-
rity attribute — the denial of service threat, for example, is
only targeting availability — while other threats (e.g., tam-
pering with data) can target more than one attribute or even
all of them (e.g., spooﬁng of identities).
For this ﬁrst section, we consider threats on the ID sys-
tem of an EPC setup like the one shown in Figure 1. We
are therefore interested on those threats targeting the main
transaction of information at this level, i.e., the exchange of
the EPC code assigned to a given tag t ∈ TA and read by a
given reader r ∈ RA. We assume moreover that the attacker
acts from the outside in order to exploit the insecure com-
munication channel between reader r and tag t, as well as
the lack of authentication and/or negotiation between both
components. We therefore assume for our work that the
attacker does not have physical access neither to the com-
ponentsofthe ID system norto the infrastructureitself. The
reason why we do not consider for our work such a phys-
ical access is because we presume that other security and
privacy mechanism in the company, such as physical ac-
cess control and surveillance of workers, must apply at this
level. The attacker, however, may have access to informa-
tion about both the ID system infrastructure and its compo-
nents. Taking into account these assumptions, we summa-
rize in Table 2 the complete results of our evaluation.
Let us start our evaluation by ranking the motivation and
difﬁculties of the spooﬁng threat. While the spooﬁng of
a legal tag t into the system may only represent a disrup-
tion into the system rather than an opportunity for gain,
the spooﬁng of a legal reader r might result in a gain for
an attacker if later he or she may offer the malicious ser-
vice to a competitor or thief who looks to perform an unau-
thorized inventory of the supply chain. The vulnerability
that the attacker would try to exploit to manage the ﬁnal
objective of scanning EPC tags from company A with an
unauthorized reader is the absence of secure authentication
between readers in RA and tags in TA. Since we deﬁned
above that the attacker does not have physical access to the
ID system, he or she may ﬁnd some difﬁculties for exploit-
ing such lack of secure authentication. In fact, current EPC
Gen-2 tags [7] support for example 16-bit Pseudo-Random
Number Generator (PRNG) and Cyclic Redundancy Code
(CRC) on chip, that might be used to improvethe reader-to-
tag link characteristics. They also include a 32-bit PIN for
reading/writing the internal memory of the tag, as well as a
32-bit PIN for executing an internal auto-killing routine in
order to destroy the information stored in the tag. However,
4Threat Motivation Difﬁculty Likelihood Impact Risk
Spooﬁng of identities High Solvable Possible High Critical
Tampering with data Moderate Strong Unlikely Low Minor
Repudiation Moderate Solvable Possible Medium Major
Information disclosure High Solvable Possible High Critical
Denial of service Low Strong Unlikely Low Minor
Elevation of privilege Low Strong Unlikely Low Minor
Table 2. ID system threats analysis.
the absence of stronger cryptographic functionalities (e.g.,
hashfunctionslikeMD5andSHA-1)limitstheexecutionof
secure authentication mechanisms between reader and tags
and leaves open the possibility of malicious readers from
impersonating legal readers. Then, we can conclude that
an attacker from the outside equipped with an EPC Gen-2
compatible reader can theoretically scan objects in motion
from the supply chain, if he or she successfully manages to
place the reader at the appropriate distance from the tags.
According to [5], the information stored on an EPC tag
is simply an identiﬁcation number for a speciﬁc object in
motion in the supply chain, and no additional information
beyond the number itself is conveyed in the EPC. Any ad-
ditional informationassociated with such a number must be
retrieved by an EPC Information Service (EPCIS). With-
out access to this information, the EPC number itself is
meaningless. However, we consider that the reality is dif-
ferent. We believe that if an attacker may access the data
stored into a legal EPC tag, and if such data is the EPC
code itself, the attacker may successfully determine types
and quantities of items in the supply chain, and properly
sell the information to further competitors of thieves. First,
the attacker can obtain further information from a proper
EPC code, like the manufacturer and the product number.
This information may be used for corporate espionage pur-
poses by competitors, or further attacks against the rest of
the infrastructure (cf. Section 3.3 and Section 3.4). Even
more, by using the EPC codes scanned with the unautho-
rized reader, the attacker may even clone those tags through
a skimming attack, by spooﬁng in this manner, legal tags
in TA without physical access to the ID system infrastruc-
ture. We therefore consider that the motivation of an at-
tacker for the spooﬁng threat should be considered as high,
and the difﬁculties as solvable. Hence the motivation and
difﬁculties associated to this threat leads to a likelihood that
is classiﬁed in our work as possible. Regarding the impact
associated to this threat, we consider it as high, since it may
have serious consequences for the company either the at-
tacker offers the malicious service to a competitor or to a
thief. According to the methodology presented in Section
2, the threat is assessed as critical and needs to be handled
with proper countermeasures.
Let us now move to the second threat, tampering with
data. Here we consider the possibility of an attacker from
adding, deleting, or modifying the information stored into
a tag t ∈ TA, or which is being transmitted from tag t to a
reader r ∈ RA. The motivation of the attacker is disrupting
business operations and causing a loss of revenue to com-
pany A. Since this threat represents for the attacker a dis-
ruption rather than a clear opportunity for gain, we rate the
motivation for this threat as moderate. Regarding the difﬁ-
culties for performingan attack which will lead the attacker
to the objective of this threat we rate them as strong.
The reason why we rate the difﬁculty of this threat as
strong, compared with the difﬁculties of the previous threat
spooﬁng,is because the attacker should successfully bypass
the same difﬁculties presented before for spooﬁng threats
and moreover: (1) the attacker should successfully bypass
the necessary 32-bit PIN to ﬁnally access the internal mem-
oryofthetag(e.g.,byperformingapoweranalysis attackas
the one presented in [15]), in case the tampering with data
targetsthetagt itself; or(2)incaseit targetstheinformation
that is going to be transmitted from t to r, the attacker must
re-inject the data once tampered at the precise instant that
the reader is requestingit and, moreover,to bypass any pos-
sible collision with the information sent from the legal tag.
We therefore consider that there are strong technical difﬁ-
culties in conducting a proper attack for this threat, and we
rate its likelihood as unlikely. Since the impact to the com-
pany may result in temporary disruption rather than great
ﬁnancial losses, we rate the impact as low; and, according
to our analysis methodology (cf. Section 2), we rank the
threat as minor.
The following threat to analyze is the repudiation threat.
Like we introduced above, although each reader r ∈ RA
sendsto thecorrespondingmiddlewarem∈MA a timestamp
and its location (among other information), this is only an
evidence, but not a proof of the transaction. The motiva-
tion of a retailer denying that has received a certain pallet
or case, due to the lack of non-repudiation protocols on the
EPCglobal network infrastructure, may clearly address ﬁ-
nancial gains. We rate the motivation as moderate. On the
other hand, the difﬁculties, if any, are going to be related
with existing laws and legislations, and are clearly solvable.
5The impact to the company may constitute some ﬁnancial
losses, and we rate it as medium. Given the likelihood (i.e.,
possible) and impact associated with this threat, it is ranked
as major. It therefore needs to be properly handled.
We continue our analysis evaluating now the informa-
tion disclosure threat. We recall that the communication
channel between a reader r ∈ RA and a tag t ∈ TA are acces-
sible over the air via an insecure wireless channel. Thus,
illegitimate collection of this exchange of information, al-
though might be slightly protected by reducing the recep-
tion range or by sheltering the area, is theoretically possible
by means of eavesdropping attacks. Clearly the motivation
for this threat must be rated as high, since the disclosure of
the information related with the ID system, as we pointed
out above for the spooﬁng threat, may be used by a poten-
tial attacker for offering such malicious service to competi-
tors, thieves, or any other individual looking for the objects
tagged in the supply chains. The uniqueness of the infor-
mation stored within an EPC tag, moreover, can also result
in the unique tracking of individuals carryingsuch tags. So,
similar reasonings as the ones we used above to rank the
spooﬁng threat as critical enables us to rank the informa-
tion disclosure threat at the same level.
Let us evaluate now the likelihood and impact of a de-
nial of service threat against an EPC based RFID scenario
as the one shown in Figure 3. Although the motivation for
the attacker may be moderate if he or she expects ﬁnan-
cial gainings, we consider that only a temporary disruption
and limited outages apply at this level (e.g., ID system).
Two kind of attacks may be used by the attacker in order
to manage the objective of this threat. On the one hand,
the attacker may use a compatible reader from the outside
and try to kill the set of tags in TA by sending them the kill
command. As we introduced before, current EPC Gen-2
tags support on-board, for privacy purposes, an auto-killing
routine which destroys the complete information stored in
the tag. Such routine is protected by a 32-bit PIN. Al-
though there are strong difﬁculties to retrieve such a PIN,
it is theoretically possible. In [15], for example, the authors
presented a proof-of-concept attack which does not require
physical contact to the targeted tags, and that can retrieve
the 8-bit PIN which protects the same routine on EPC Gen-
1 tags. Although this proof-of-conceptis only available for
EPC Gen-1 tags, the authors in [15] state that EPC Gen-2
tags are equally vulnerable to the same principle. We there-
fore rate the technical difﬁculties for such attack as strong.
On the other hand, the attacker may manage a similar
disruption of the ID system by using an RFID jamming at-
tack, i.e., by using a powerful transmitter from the outside
thatemitssignals ornoiseonthesame frequencyandmodu-
lationas the targetedreaders. Althoughsuchattack is possi-
ble, and solvable, the strength of the signal might be illegal
and it is very easy to discover where the transmitter is lo-
cated in order to stop it — for that reason the motivation
should be rated as low. We therefore consider that in both
cases, thelikelihoodforthisattackmustberatedas unlikely.
Given that a denial of service represents to the company a
temporal disruption of its operations rather than ﬁnancial
losses, we rate the impact as low. According to this likeli-
hood and impact associated to this threat, we ﬁnally rank it
as minor.
We ﬁnally conclude this section by evaluating the eleva-
tion of privilege threat. Although we assume for our eval-
uation that there is a lack of authentication and/or negoti-
ation between reader r and tag t, we assume however that
an attacker could try to modify the conﬁgurationof reader r
(by using conﬁguration or programming ﬂaws in this de-
vice) in order to read tags which it is not meant to read
and cause service disruption. The motivationof the attacker
is thus rated as low, and the impact to the system is also
rated as low. The technical difﬁculties are however rated as
strong, due to the difﬁculty of modifying readers’ conﬁgu-
ration without physical access. The resulting likelihood is
hence rated as unlikely, and the threat ranked as minor.
3.2 Middleware threats
Beyondtraditionalthreatsonwirednetworksystems(which
are not analyzed in this paper) a speciﬁc threat to RFID
middleware has recently been reported in [16]. The authors
identify the possibility of using malware to attack middle-
ware and back-end databases of an RFID system. Their ap-
proachclassiﬁes suchmalwareintothefollowingthreecate-
gories: (1) exploits, (2) worms, and (3) viruses. The former
are attacks carried within the information stored into RFID
tags. They target the security of middleware and database
components placed at the back-end of the system. Worms
andvirusesareRFIDexploitswhichspreadthemselvesover
newRFID tags byusingnetworkconnections(inthe case of
worms) or connectionless self-replication strategies (in the
case of viruses).
The malware reported in [16] exploits the trust relation-
ship between a middleware instance m ∈ MA and the infor-
mation sent by a reader r ∈ RA (cf. Figure 3). The au-
thors in [16] consider that even if there is a very tiny win-
dow for storing information into an RFID tag, traditional
attacks against information systems (e.g., buffer overﬂows
and SQL injection attacks) might be condensed into a small
portion of bits harmful enough to break the security of the
global system. The authors in [16] present, moreover,a ﬁrst
proof-of-concept that uses RFID tags to carry a SQL in-
jection attack to compromise the security of the back-end
layer of a traditional RFID setup. The research reported in
[16], as well as their proof-of-concept, received some criti-
cisms and disapprovals, especially from the RFID industry
[20]. We think that the work presented in [16] is interesting
6Threat Motivation Difﬁculty Likelihood Impact Risk
Spooﬁng of identities High Solvable Possible High Critical
Tampering with data Moderate Solvable Possible Medium Major
Repudiation Moderate Solvable Possible Medium Major
Information disclosure High Solvable Possible High Critical
Denial of service Moderate Solvable Possible Medium Major
Elevation of privilege High Strong Unlikely High Critical
Table 3. Discovery service threats analysis.
and relevant. However, and taking into account the speciﬁc
scenario shown in this section, we consider that the like-
lihood for those threats must be rated as unlikely, due to
the strong difﬁculties that an attacker without physical ac-
cess to the infrastructuremust bypass (e.g., limitation of the
space to store the malware, i.e., 96 bits3; the non existence
ofrealworldvulnerabilitiesonEPC middlewarethat should
beexploitedusingthe techniquesdescribedin [16]; ﬁltering
mechanisms implemented in EPC based middlewares; and
so on). We therefore conclude that even if the impact of
this threat could be ranked as high, due to its likelihood the
threat must be ranked on an EPC based scenario as minor.
3.3 Discovery service threats
The main functionality of the Object Name Service (ONS)
[8] is a subset of functions of the Domain Names Service
(DNS). Hence, it is fair to assume that deﬁciencies on se-
curity and privacy already reported for the DNS are also
going to affect the use of the ONS. According to [10], and
althoughthespeciﬁc addressdiscoveryservicesforEPCap-
plicationsarenotﬁrmlyspeciﬁedyetin[5], we canenvision
some early threats by studying the resolution scheme pro-
posed by EPCglobal for the ONS [8].
The ONS behaves as follows. Once a reader r receives
the identiﬁer of an EPC tag, it forwards it to a local
middleware instance m ∈ MA of the application. In turn,
the middleware, or the corresponding address manager
of the EPC based application, publishes the address into
the ONS instance associated to the discovery service of
the EPCglobal network. This allows trading partners to
query relevant information about the tagged object. To
perform such an operation, a given Uniform Resource
Identiﬁer (URI) is associated to the object in the form of an
encoded concatenation of the attribute ﬁeld values of the
tag identiﬁer. Those external applications e ∈ E can then
use this URI, together with the subdomain onsepc.com
3Although the same authors reported in [17] that there is still room to
encode an attack on the 96 bits available on an EPCtag, e.g, the SQL attack
“;shutdown” that only requires 63 bits, we fail to ﬁnd real world vulner-
abilities onthe ﬁltering and collection middlewares speciﬁed byEPCglobal
where such an attack could apply.
(which is reserved for ONS discovery services) to con-
struct proper Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) (e.g.,
object-class.company-identifier.header-
.onsepc.com). By using these URLs, the applications
can ﬁnally query the discovery server which, in turn,
recycles in this manner existing DNS procedures and
further delegation functions [10].
The main drawbackof this scheme, froma security point
of view, is the reutilization of the DNS protocol which, un-
fortunately, is potentially harmful and may imply for new
threats to the EPC infrastructure. We may ﬁnd in [1], for
example, a list of well known DNS vulnerabilities such as
(1) interception of packets; (2) ID guessing and query pre-
diction; (3) betrayal of trusted services; and (4) denial of
service. Given these and other vulnerabilities on DNS, it
is straightforward to assume that threats against the avail-
ability of ONS resources, as well as conﬁdentiality and ac-
countabilitythreats to the exchangeof data betweencompa-
nies and ONS servers, andfurtherintegrityissues, aregoing
to appear at this level. We evaluate in the sequel the set of
threats identiﬁed in Section 3.1 to the discovery service of
the EPCglobal network based scenario shown in Figure 3.
We take into consideration for this evaluation the same as-
sumptions stated before, i.e., the attacker acts from outside
the infrastructure and does not have physical access to the
components of the company. We summarize in Table 3 the
results of our an evaluation.
Letusstart byevaluatingthespooﬁngofidentitiesthreat.
We assume two different scenarios: (1) the attacker im-
personates an external application, and executes a dictio-
nary attack in order to generate random queries that target
the ONS/DNS instances associated to the discovery service
utilized by company A; (2) the attacker impersonates the
ONS/DNS serverassociated to companyA, by usinga man-
in-the-middleattack forexample,in orderto receivequeries
addressing products associated to such company. In both
cases, the ﬁnal objective of the attacker is the gathering of
proper URLs to determine which products are actually lo-
cated in company A. To do so, the attacker may try to iso-
late, for example,the manufacturerand/orthe productnum-
berassociated to thoseURLs. This informationmay besold
by the attacker to competitors or thieves. We therefore rate
7the motivation as high. Regarding the technical difﬁculties,
and according to [1], they are perfectly possible and there-
fore solvable. These motivation and difﬁculties allows us
to rate the likelihood associated to this threat as possible.
On the other hand, the impact for the company should be
considered as high, since it may lead to ﬁnancial losses if
such information is delivered to a competitor or to a thief.
According to the methodology presented in Section 2, the
threat is assessed as critical.
For the second threat, i.e., tampering with data, we as-
sumethe possibilityof an attackerfrominterceptingqueries
sent froman external applicatione∈ E to the ONS/DNS in-
stanceassociated to companyA andrespondingfalse URLs.
The ﬁnal objective is leading e to proceed its further ex-
changeofinformationwitha maliciousinformationservice.
If this attack is successfully executed, the attacker can de-
liverfalseinformationtothepartnersassociatedtocompany
A and hence, leading to a loss of reputation or trust to the
information of such company. We rate the motivation of an
attacker as moderate since it can disrupt the operations of
companyAandsomekindofgainif thepartnersmayﬁnally
be redirected to a malicious informationservice. According
to [1], the attacker may successfully apply this threat by
using session hijacking and/or manipulation of queries, for
example. We thereforeassume that the exploitationof these
vulnerabilities is theoretically possible and we rate the dif-
ﬁculties of this threat as solvable. These two parameters
derive a likelihood rated as possible. Concerning the im-
pact, we consider that this threat may cause to the company
a loss of reputation and even some kind of economical con-
sequences if, as an addition of the poisoning of URLs, the
trading partner ﬁnally exchangesinformationwith a non le-
gitimateserver. We thus rate the impact as medium and, as a
consequence, we rank the threat as major. That means that
the threat must be properly handled.
Let us continue by evaluating the risk of the repudiation
threat. Here, we assume either the possibility of an external
applicatione∈E oranaddressmanagera∈AA forperform-
ing illegal operations against the ONS/DNS component of
the discovery service associated to company A. This is per-
fectly possible given the lack of tracing or auditing such
operations. Although it is perfectly fair to conceive the pos-
sibility of adding audit trails at this level, it seems that no
repudiation protocol at both the ONS and DNS are actually
going to guarantee strong difﬁculties for an attacker from
applying such a threat [1, 10]. We hence rate the motiva-
tion for the attacker as moderate, since he or she may offer
the service to trading partners or customers of company A
for denying the proper service during the publishing and/or
resolution of addresses; and we rate the difﬁculties associ-
ated to this threat as solvable. These parameters lead to a
likelihood rated as possible. The impact to the company
for evading responsibilities when demanding a proof of the
operations performed at the ONS instance of the discovery
service level might result in some kindof economicalreper-
cussions. Itthusleadstoanimpactratedinourevaluationas
medium. The threat is ﬁnally rankedas major, which means
that it must be properly handled in order to add, for exam-
ple, appropriate audit trails associated to the infrastructure
and hence, reduce its likelihood.
We move now to the fourth threat, i.e., information dis-
closure. As we have assumed till now, and since the com-
pletediscoveryserviceforanEPC basedapplicationhasnot
publiclybeenyetspeciﬁedin[5], weonlyanalyzethepossi-
bility of leakageat the ONS/DNS instances of the discovery
service. We recall that such operations are based on a clear
textprotocolwhichuses URLs basedon ﬁeldvalues ofEPC
codes. It means that, by deﬁnition, the use of these URLs
without additional countermeasures leads to a leakage of
data such as manufacturers and product numbers. The mo-
tivation of an attacker for looking for an attack path for this
threat is clearly high, since such informationcan potentially
be sold to competitors and thieves. The difﬁculties for ex-
ecuting the attack are solvable [1], which directly leads to
rate the likelihood of this threat as possible. Given this like-
lihood and the repercussions for the company related with
the illegal disclosure of information, i.e., high impact, we
asses the information disclosure threat as critical; and we
emphasize the necessity for handlingit with the appropriate
countermeasures.
Regarding the following threat, i.e., denial of service,
and since the service offered by the ONS/DNS can be seen
as a critical component of an EPC based RFID application
of company A (cf. Figure 3), we assume that the impact
for the company in case that such a service fails might be
medium, since it is not going to be able to offer to the trad-
ing partners the on-line service that is meant to offer, i.e.,
information about the objects in its supply chain. DNS-like
services have traditionallysuffered from vulnerabilitiesthat
might be used in order to target their availability [1]. The
dependency between the ONS and DNS allows us to con-
clude that such lack of resistance against denial of service
threats is also present in the ONS. This fact leads to rate
the difﬁculties of an attacker for performing such threat as
solvable. The motivation for the attacker, given such weak
difﬁculties, might fairly be rated as moderate. We thus con-
sider the likelihood of this threat as possible and, then, its
risk is assessed as major. Similarly to the previous threats,
it must be handled by appropriate countermeasures.
We ﬁnally conclude this section by evaluating the eleva-
tionofprivilegethreat. AlthoughDNS-like systems, as they
are widely deployedon current Internet based technologies,
havenoauthenticationproceduresfortheexchangeofinfor-
mation, we assume however that conﬁguration deﬁciencies
or programmingﬂaws (e.g., buffer overﬂowvulnerabilities)
on such systems might be exploited by an attacker in order
8Threat Motivation Difﬁculty Likelihood Impact Risk
Spooﬁng of identities High Solvable Possible High Critical
Tampering with data Moderate Solvable Possible Medium Major
Repudiation Moderate Solvable Possible Medium Major
Information disclosure High Solvable Possible High Critical
Denial of service Moderate Solvable Possible Medium Major
Elevation of privilege High Strong Unlikely High Critical
Table 4. Information service threats analysis.
to elevate his or her privileges (e.g., beyond the proper re-
ception of an URL, or list of URLs, retrieving, for example,
further information from company’s resources). Since, to
the best of our knowledge, there are not yet precedents of
these deﬁciencies on current ONS implementations, we as-
sume that the technical difﬁculties associated to this threat,
althoughtheoretically possible, are sufﬁciently high and we
ratedthemas strong. Since the motivationforthe attackeris
goingto beequallyhigh,dueto the widerangeofobjectives
that this threat can target (cf. Table 1), we rate both motiva-
tion and impact as high. The resulting likelihood is hence
rated as unlikely. However, given the high impact to the
company if the threat is successfully applied, we rate this
later threat as critical, which means that have to be handled
by appropriate countermeasures.
3.4 Information service threats
During the last stage of the scenario shown in Figure 3,
and once a given external application e ∈ E receives from
the discovery service the proper address of the information
service is ∈ ISA, an exchange of information through In-
ternet based technologies (e.g., web based applications) is
conducted. To interact securely, EPCglobal leaves end par-
ties, i.e., trading partners using the EPCglobal network, in
charge for the protection of those key aspects related with
the exchange of data. Although EPCglobal brieﬂy recalls
in its speciﬁcation that trading partners may wish authenti-
cation and authorization upon that information [6], it only
givessome optionalbindingsin orderto (1) authenticatethe
identity of the application which is requesting the informa-
tion; (2) authenticate the identity of the application which
is offering the information; (3) authorize the access to the
requested information regarding the identities associated to
each party. In fact, each party in this interaction must estab-
lish those security mechanisms they consider necessary.
From our point of view, this decision may have nega-
tive consequences and lead to situations where a malicious
adversary could successfully exploit weak security mecha-
nisms implementedon lowcost EPC basedsetups. Like any
other Internet based application, and especially when mul-
tiple security domains interoperate, attacks against weak
authentication/authorizationprocedures between parties, or
againsttheintegrityorconﬁdentialityofthecommunication
channel between them, can be used by specialized attackers
in orderto applythosethreats identiﬁedinbothSections 3.1
and 3.3. If we assume a worst case scenario, where a weak
control upon information applies, as well as those other se-
curity ﬂaws reported in previous section, equal results will
apply at the information service level. We therefore con-
sider that by using identical assumptions, the same evalua-
tion of threats reported in Section 3.3 equally applies at the
information service level. We summarize the evaluation in
Table 4. Let us notice that all six threats must to be handled,
being those threats ranked as critical the ones which should
be addressed with the highest priority.
4 Conclusions and future work
Security and privacy threats on RFID technologies are be-
coming one of the major concerns of information security
researchers. The pervasiveness of these technologies and
the power limitations of some of their components pose a
great challenge when dealing with the problem of detecting
and responding to threats on current and future EPC based
RFID applications. We havepresentedin this paperan anal-
ysis of threats in orderto identifyand rankthose security is-
sues thatwe considerrelevantforfurtherresearch. We iden-
tiﬁed in our work two critical threats at the ID system level,
three at the Discovery Service level, and three at the Infor-
mation System level. We identiﬁed two major threats at the
ID system level, three at the Discovery Service level, and
three at the Information Service level. Such threats must be
handled by proper countermeasures.
We have not covered in this paper existing countermea-
sures that may be applied for those threats analyzed in our
work. We refer the reader to [13] for a complete review on
recent literature and scientiﬁc solutions that can be applied
to handle both critical and major threats at the ID system
level. The reader may ﬁnd there some mechanisms, such
as lightweight authentication protocols and anti-forgery
procedures, that could be included in current EPC based
scenarios in order to countermeasurethose threats analyzed
in Section 3.1. Concerning critical and major threats at the
Discovery Service level, some existing countermeasures,
such as DNSSEC, TLS/SSL, VPNs, anonymizers, and
9pseudo-random number strategies, may be used to address
the threats analyzed in Section 3.3. On the other hand,
the use of identity federation frameworks, such as Liberty
Alliance and Microsoft .NET Passport among others, may
also be seen as early countermeasures to those critical
and major threats to and by the Information Service level
reported in Section 3.4. However, most of these solutions
result in limitations to the scalability and performance of
applicationsbased on the EPCglobal network,or are simply
not ﬁne grained enough for the problematic we addressed
in both Sections 3.3 and 3.4. Works in progress proposed
in [11, 14]) seem more effective and sound for our problem
domain. We are going to address and analyze some of these
proposals in the forthcoming stage of our work.
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